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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK B. WOOD and
SHIRL \Y. HALES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9985

NORTH SALT LAKE,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant-Respon,dent.

Respondent's Brief On Appeal
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
As stated in the Brief of Appellants, this is an action
by plaintiffs for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the City
of North Salt Lake to issue a building permit which
would enable them to build a residence in the Paul Subdivision of North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on stipulated facts before the
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge of the Second Judicial District and the \Y rit of 1\iandamus was
denied.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the decision of the trial
court and the issuance of a Writ of _Mandamus. The respondent asks that the judgment of the lower court he
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case were stipulated by the parties
and the written stipulation of facts appears in the record beginning at page 7. Appellants have rewritten
these facts in their brief and have inserted various statements that are not supported by the record. For this
reason respondent will state the facts in the exact manner in which they were stipulated. These facts are as
follows:
1. That on or about October 18, 1955, Louis J. Bowers Sr. and Ella C. Bowers, his wife, being then the
owners of a tract of land in the Town of North Salt
Lake, Davis County, subdivided said land into lots and
streets, said subdivision now being known as ''Paul Subdivision." That Exhibit "A" [see Figure 1], attached
hereto, is a plat of said original subdivision.

2. That the Paul Subdivision "'as duly accepted by
the Town Board of North Salt Lake on or about October 18, 1955, and the streets as shown in the plat were
dedicated for the perpetual use of the public by the subdividers; that after approval by the municipal authorities the plat was duly recorded in the Recorder's Office
of Davis County on the 18th day of October, 1955, as
Entry No. 150887, in Book P or L & L, at Page 231.
2
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3. That thereafter the subdivision was transferred to
Modern Housing Corporation, a Utah corporation, and
that certain subdivision improvements were made in said
subdivision and certain homes were built on said subdivision.
4. That since the date of the approval of the subdivision up to and including the present time, the area of
the subdivision as shown by the shaded portion of Exhibit
''A'' has remained undeveloped to the following extent:
(a) No homes or other buildings have been constructed in this area.
(b) No streets have been constructed in this
area.
(c) ~ o curb, gutter, sidewalk, paving or lighting has been installed in this area.
5. That the area of the subdivision represented by
the shaded portion of Exhibit ''A'' has been developed to
the following extent:
(a) That water mains were installed at the time
the subdivision was approved and run in front of
all lots.
(b) That water connection fees were paid to the
Town of North Salt Lake for 26 of said lots in October of 1955.
(c) That in July of 1961 the South Davis County Sewer Improvement District installed sewer mains
in this area and a connection tee was left to provide
future service to the following lots : Lots 90-95, Lots
74-79, and Lots 16-19.

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

z0
H

w.
H

>

,

H

~

~~
100'

_ W.i?. .;"~"'

...
r

p

r

,,",,

~

p

<

In

51

w.

~ ~
>1 ~

~~~~.f'.

71.21'

;.. . ,:, .. J o.. 11
~ \!
Dv V~'"- ;
~ 52
I
~

::-~
~
8

"

,,,

/J,

r

_.,

p

L-50

a::

Q

s

~

8
~

~
,-..

.f'tAipi<o t! .

-:-r;.(};>•p!.'n

t-

{ .. ·

.J,(, ...

~ ,~, ,1,1 '.J~.,

%

~

~

47

.......

..-.

~
0

c.

~ 0

H
~

~

11111)

~0
Cl
Z
r.1
~

DRIVE

-i "'seg•sa·~: .,

H

~

ll'"

1511.. '1>111'01

;.,
b'!
... 0

~

•l

4E.
,.,, .. 1,. £.

-·

.~

tl.'l"! ,,.

""'

~

45

""?.::~··

~D.t .. ,. ,.-·

-

~~~,

Sponsored by~,;.the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
~
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. ,. .::.

If:\

6. That the remaining portion of the subdivision was
fully developed and that all of the subdivision and street
improvements were completed, however, said portion of
the subdivision was amended to the extent as shown on
the amended plat, which is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" [see figure 2] and made a part of this stipulation.
7. That in January of 1963 plaintiffs, Jack B. Wood
and Shirl W. Hales purchased from Modern Housing
Corporation the following lots in Paul Subdivision: Lots
15-19, Lots 74-79, and Lots 90-95.
8. That on August 6, 1957, the Town Board of North
Salt Lake duly enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance
and zoning plan for the Town of North Salt Lake; that
the area surrounding and including the Paul SubdiYision
was zoned R-S for residential suburban use.
9. That Section 15-5-1 of the North Salt Lake Zoning Ordinance provides that the minimum lot area for
any building lot in the R-S zone shall be 7,000 square
feet.
10. That none of the lots as platted in the shaded
portion of Exhibit "A" contain 7,000 square feet; that
in all other respects said lots conform to the building of
zoning ordinances of North Salt Lake.
11. That the comprehensive zoning ordinances of
North Salt Lake which was enacted August 6, 1957, also
contains the following provisions :
1-11. NoNCONFORMING BuiLDING LoTs A~D UsEs.
The lawful use of any building, structure, or land
6
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t-xiHting at the time of the adoption of this ordinall('P may be ('ontinued subject to all of the provisions of Chapter 8 though such building or use
does not conform to the regulations of the zone in
which it is located, and any nonconforming building lot may be used for any lawful use set forth in
the regulations for the zone in which it is located
Hnhjert to the restrictions set forth in section ----·
8-~. CoNTINUATION oF NoN CONFORMING UsEs AND
~wxs. Subject to all limitations herein set forth,

the operation of a nonconforming use and the
maintenance of a nonconforming sign may be continued after the effective date of this ordinance.
On or before January 1, 1958, or January 1st of
any following year, following the effective date of
this ordinance or of any amendment hereto by
which the use of sign became non-conforming, the
owner or owners of both the land on which a nonconforming use is located, and the structure or
structures in which a non-conforming use is located, and the owner of land on which a nonconforming use is located shall register such nonconforming use or sign by filing with the Zoning Administrator a registration statement for such nonconforming use or sign, which shall include a notarized affidavit setting forth the time that such use
or sign came into existence, the size of the sign
and the size and extent of the nonconforming use
existing on the effective date of this ordinance.
The Zoning Administrator shall preserve such
statements and affiidavits and on the basis of such
documents and upon the approval of the Planning
Commission, certificates of occupancy shall be
issued for each nonconforming use, one copy of
which shall be sent to the owner of the nonconforming use or sign, one copy to the license assessor, and one copy shall be retained in the file of
the Zoning Administrator. Permits for nonconSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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forming signs shall be issued by the Zoning Administrator as if application for permits for new
signs were made. A careful record of such signs
shall be maintained by the Zoning Administrator.
8-6. TERMINATION OF NoNcONFORMING UsEs AND
SIGNS. (1) BY ABANDONMENT. A nonconforming
use of a building or a nonconforming use of land
or a nonconforming sign which has been abandoned shall not thereafter be returned to such
nonconforming use. A nonconforming use or sign
shall be considered abandoned (a) when the characteristic equipment and the furnishings of the
non-conforming use have been removed and have
not been replaced by similar equipment within one
year, (b) when the nonconforming sign has been
removed, (c) when the building or premises occupied by a nonconforming use are left vacant for a
period of one ( 1) year or more, (d) when the use
or sign has been replaced by a conforming use,
(e) when the use or sign has been replaced by a
use which is not conforming to the provisions of
the zone in which it is located. (While the changing of a nonconforming use or sign to a nonconforming or illegal use does terminate the right to
continue such nonconforming use, the replacement
use shall not be permitted to be operated.) (f)
when the intent of the owner to discontinue the
use is apparent as evidenced by his failure to register a nonconforming use of land or structure
which was not in operation on the effective date of
this ordinance, or a nonconforming sign in the
manner and within the time required by this
chapter.
12. That no registration statement or affidavit has
ever been filed with the Zoning Administrator of North
Salt Lake covering any non-conforming use in the Paul
Subdivision.
8
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13. rrlwt after aequiring certain lots in the Paul Subdivi~ion, plaintiffs made application to the Building Department of North Salt Lake for a building permit to con~trurt a dwelling house on Lot 90, which is 60 feet x 100
f•·d.

14. That the applicants for the building permit ha,·e
offered to guarantee the installation of the remaining
subdh·ision improvements for said lot, but notwithstanding said fact, the building inspector denied said application and refused to issue a building permit on the ground
that said lot fails to comply with the minimum area requirements as set forth in the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance of North Salt Lake.
1:J. rrhat on the 11th day of February, 1963, plaintiffs filed a petition for review with the North Salt Lake
Board of Adjustment, requesting a reversal of the decision of the Building Inspector; that said petition was
heard by the Board of Adjustment on Febn1ary 25, 1963,
and on ~Iarch 9, 1963, plaintiffs were notified that said
petition \\·as denied, but that the Board of Adjustment
did not serve copies of its Findings of Fact upon the
plaintiffs as required by Section 2-10-5 and Section
:2-10-11 (2) of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of
Xorth Salt Lake, notwithstanding the fact that demand
was made for findings.
Contrary to what is stated in appellant's brief, there
Is nothing in the record or in the stipulation of facts
showing that water connection fees have not been refunded to ~[odern Housing Corporation or the plaintiffs,
9
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or that any request has been made for any such refund;
that sewer lines were not available in the area at the
time of the passage of the zoning ordinance; that the area
could not be replatted; that water mains have been granted to any water district or easements given; or that any
connection tees exist in the water lines.
It is also to be noted that this case does not involve
an amendment to an existing zoning ordinance in an attempt to discriminate against any particular subdivider,
but rather it involves the passage of a complete comprehensive zoning ordinance, providing a zoning plan for the
Town of North Salt Lake (R-9).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLATTING AND RECORDING OF A
SUBDIVISION DOES NOT EXEJ\1PT THE
PROPERTY THEREIN FROM FUTURE ZONING ORDINANCES; NOR DOES IT CREATE
ANY VESTED PROPERTY OR CONTRACT RIGHT ON THE PART OF THE
DEDICATOR.

1. The Zoning Ordinance of North Salt Lake
Is a V a.lid amd Reasonable Ordinance.
It is clear in this case that the reason plaintiffs were
denied the building permit which they sought was because the building lot in question fails to comply with
the minimum area requirements as established by the
North Salt Lake Zoning Ordinance. The cases and authorities cited in plaintiffs' brief do not involve the va-

10
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lidity of a. zoning ordinance and thus are not applicable
to the ill~tant case. They simply hold that the acceptance
mul n•(·ording of a subdivision plat operates as a dedil'H tion of the platted streets for public use.
The statutes
provide a method for the vacating or changing of a subdivision plat ( 37-5-6, 7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) and
the t•ase of Boskovich v. Midvale City Corporation, 121
rtah 443, 243 P. 2d 435, cited by plaintiffs, holds that a
street can be vacated if the proper procedure is followed.
It is difficult to see how any private easements could be
established over the undeveloped portion of the Paul
Subdivision in North Salt Lake, particularly in light of
the fact that the proposed streets have never been construded nor are there any homes or other structures in
this area. Further, there is no evidence here of any claim
to a pri,·ate right of way. Nor is there any evidence
in thUi case of the request of the property owners or the
refusal of the City of North Salt Lake to vacate the
streets. It has been held that the owner or his successor
can reclaim the use of dedicated property when the object and purpose of making the dedication have completely failed, Am. Jur. Dedication, Section 64; also, that
land will revert to the dedicator when the intended use
becomes impossible, Am. Jur. Dedication, Section 65.
Assuming, however, as plaintiffs have argued, that
the filing and acceptance of the subdivision plat operates
as an unconditional dedication of the platted streets, it
does not follow that a platted subdivision cannot be included in and made the subject of a valid zoning ordinance. Respondent has been unable to find any authority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for such an extreme position and certainly no such authority has been cited by appellants in their brief. To
say that zoning ordinances do not apply to property abutting on a dedicated street is to practically nullify the
entire purpose of zoning.
A municipality clearly has the power to enact zoning ordinances. This power is given in 10-9-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
''RIGHT To REGULATE ZoNING. For the purpose of
promoting health, safety, morals, and the general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of
cities and towns is empowered to regulate andrestrict the height, number of stories and size of
buildings and other structures, the percentage of
lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts
and other open spaces, the density of population
and the location and use of buildings."
The above specifically gives the city the power to impose minimum area requirements. In construing the extent of the zoning power of a municipality, the Utah court
has held in Hargraves v. Young, 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P. 2d
974, that sideyard requirements are valid and reasonably
relate to public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
It would be completely unreasonable to assume any different holding with respect to the imposition of minimum
area requirements and such requirements haYe been generall~· held by the courts to be proper subjects for zoning, Am. Jur. Zoning, Section 52.
Some of the leading cases upholding the Yalidity and
constitutionalit~· of area requirements in zoning ordi12
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mtm·es are C/(~utnlls v. ('if.IJ of Los An.geles, 36 Cal. 2d 95,

P. 2<1 439, wherein the litigants were prohibited from
conveying property in a bungalow court which had existed for a period of twenty years where conveyance of
the separate parcels would reduce the individual ownership of lots to a size below the Los Angeles minimum
lot size as established by ordinance; and Simon. v. Town
of .Vl'l'dham, 311 ~lass. 560, 42 N.E. 2d 516, "\Yherein the
court observed that a municipality may regulate lot sizes
to encourage such things as avoidance of congestion in
stn'L'ts, prevention of overcrowding land, facilitation in
furnishing transportation, light, sewer, and other public
necessities, provision of sufficient recreational space for
children to play, and the cultivation of flowers, shrubs
nnd vegetables.
jj2

Nor does the North Salt Lake zoning ordinance deprive plaintiffs of their property without just compensation. Zoning laws are enacted in the exercise of the
police power and differ from the right to restrict the use
of real property by condemnation with compensation
under the power of eminent domain. Thus such zoning
laws are ordinarily held not to be invalid as a taking of
property for public use without compensation. Am. Jur.
Xouing Section 19.

It has further been held that zoning ordinances are
pn'sumed to be valid; the burden is upon the one assailing the zoning ordinance to overcome the presumption;
and every intendment is to be indulged by the court in
favor of the validity of the measure. Am. Jur. Z onring,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

Section 16. All of these presumptions must be applied
to this ease and there is nothing in the stipulation of
facts herein which would in any way show the North
Salt Lake Zoning Ordinance to be discriminatory or
unreasonable.

2. Substarntial improvements must be coustructed on the property before any restrd
rights can accrue.

It is conceivable that in rare cases the zoning orclinanees of a municipality would not apply where there is
an intervention of "vested rights." The concept of vested rights usually involves situations where a municipality issues a building permit and then attempts to revoke
the same because of a change in the zoning ordinance. In
such eases it has been held that a vested right can accrue
when substantial expenditures have been made in good
faith by the permittee toward accomplishing the purpose
for which the permit was issued. ]fetzenbaum Law of
Zoning, page 1167.

It has also been held that no vested right can accrue
where no building permit has been issued. Price r.
Schwafel, 92 Cal. 77, 206 P. 2d 683; Jl etzenbaum Law of
Zoning, page 1171.
The following cases hold that the expenditures were
not substantial enough to establish a Yested right:
In lVl1eat Y. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 Pac. 1033, the
permittee was held to have acquired no vested right
n fter the passage of a new zoning ordinance even though
he had contracted for the erection of the building and had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dug 610 feet of trench and erected 84 feet of concrete
form~, the excavation costs amounting to $1,000.00.
The cases further hold that a municipality does not
<leprive one of vested rights by preventing construction
of a building or use of property forbidden by the zoning
Qrdinance or an amendment thereto, even though prior
to enactment of the ordinance or amendment the protesting party owned the land, Darlingtown v. Frankfort, 282
Ky. 778, 110 S.W. 2d 392; incurred travel expenses and
had tentative plans made, Rice v. V a;n, V ranken, 232 NYS,
506; removed shrubbery, cut down trees and negotiated
for a lease, Brady v. Keene, 90 N.H. 99, 4 A. 2d 658;
leased land and spent a large sum on proposed oil drilling operations, Marblehead Larnd Company v. Los Angel('s, 36 F. 2d 242; purchased land with the intent to use it
for a particular purpose, O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 CA 2d
:~..J.9, 146 P. 2d 983; purchased land, let building construction contracts, and started construction, Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 Pac. 923; secured a pproval of a plot plan, made expenditures in obtaining permits to cut curbs and install tanks, and applied for, but
had not received a building permit, Sun Oil Cornpan.y v.
Clifton, 13 N. J. 89, 80 A. 2d 258; applied for a building
permit but before its issuance ordered structural steel,
special windows and excavating, Atlas v. Dick, 86 NYS
2d 231; obtained a building permit and entered into contracts with third persons for construction of a building,
Brett Y. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 ~Iass.
i:i, 143 N.E. 269; obtained a building permit and then a
zoning ordinance was adopted prohibiting the use and
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thereafter construction work was done and liahilities incurred, Sun Oil Company v. Bradley Beach, 136 l\. J.
307, 55 A. 2d 778; spent money but made no tang·ible
change in the land itself by excavation or construction
'
Rice v. Van V rarnken, 232 NYS 506; and acquired title
to land, obtained a building permit, made a contract for
construction of the building, and a small amount of preliminary work was done by the contractor, Bregman -r.
Reville, 226 NYS 285.
3. The facts of this case do not establish any
vested rights.
The most that can be said about plaintiffs in the instant case is that they purchased the land in hopes of
constructing on the nonconforming property. \Yhen
plaintiffs purchased the lots in question in 1963 they
were presumed to know of the existence of the North Salt
Lake Zoning Ordinance. Their predecessors installed
a water line and paid some water connection fees, but
there is no evidence whatsoever that these improvements were of a substantial nature. The installation of
sewer lines and sewer connection tees cannot be considered because this was done long after the passage of the
zoning ordinance and ·would therefore have been done at
plaintiffs' risk.
There is also nothing in the record whatsoever that
indicates plaintiffs will suffer any pecuniary loss from
the operation of the zoning ordinance. It is true that
two lots will be lost if the area. is replatted, however, it is
logical to assume that if the size of the lots is increased,
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the market value of the lots will be increased. There is
no evidence to the contrary.
It ~hould also be noticed from Exhibits ''A'' and
.. H" that the developed portion of the Paul Subdivision

has been amended to conform with the North Salt Lake
Zoning Ordinance. It would be undesirable to permit
m•w construction on smaller lots which would back
against the larger lots in the amended Paul Subdivision.
It is rlear that plaintiffs have acquired no vested
rights. The City of North Salt Lake has a legitimate
intL•n·~t in the welfare of the community and desires to
prt>Yent any new construction on substandard lots.

POINT II.
IN THE EVENT PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS HAD ESTABLISHED ANY VESTED
RIGHTS OR NONCONFORMING RIGHTS AT
THE TIME OF THE PASSAGE OF THE
NORTH SALT LAI(E ZONING ORDINANCE,
SAID RIGHTS HAVE SINCE BEEN ABANDONED.
The undeveloped portion of the Paul Subdivision
has remained dormant since its dedication in 1955. The·
Xorth Salt Lake Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance was
passed on August 6, 1957. The ordinance provided for
the continuation of non-conforming uses and then provided in Section 8-6 that any such nonconforming use
shall be deemed abondoned when the premises are left
vacant for a period of one year or more. Appellants
have argued that Section 8-6 is not applicable because

-
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of the inadvertence of the City Council in not asserting
the section number in Section 1-11, the general section
providing for the continuation of nonconforming uses.
However, it is to be noted that Section 1-11 specifically
provides that it is ''subject to all of the provisions of
Chapter 8" and this would include Sections 8-2 and 8-6 ..
The nonconforming use sections also specifically refer
to the "nonconforming use of land." Ordinances must
be construed in such a manner as to give them meaning
and not in a manner as would make them meaningless
or absurd. Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Company, 107
Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98.
The only real question is whether such an abandonment statute is constitutional and it is generally held that
time limitations in an ordinance relating to non-conforming uses of property are valid and proper. See llf.rfzenba.um La1c of Zoning, page 1247.
The Utah court, in conformity ·with other jurisdictions, has recently upheld the validity of a one-year abandonment statute. Ill orrison v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 13lr
363 p. 2d 1113.
Another leading case is Franmor ReaUy Corporation
v. LeBoeuf, 104 NYS 2d 247, wherein an ordinance set
twelve months of discontinuance as a bar towards resumption of a nonconforming use. The court held the
ordinance to be reasonable and proper, even though there
was no evidence of an intended abandonment. The language of the court is as follows :

"It seems clear that in this case there was no
c\·idence whatsoever of any affirmative act on the

13
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part of the petitioner which might be construed
or deemed to be a voluntary abandonment herein.
All that appears in the record is that there was
a non-usPr for several years. As heretofore
pointed out, some of this period embraced the war
years when restrictions on gasoline forced the
closing of the station.

However, the respondent [the municipality]
relies on Section 900, subdivision 4 of the Zoning
Ordinance above quoted. The respondent construes this section to mean that the mere fact that
the business was discontinued for more than one
Yl'nr, results in an abandonment regardless of
whether or not there was any intention to abandon the nonconforming use .
. . . This leaves one remaining query: Is the
ordinance, insofar as it attempts to abolish a nonconforming use after non-use for one year, valid
and constitutional1
In this connection it must be borne in mind
that the policy of the law is the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses, and, accordingly, ordinances should not be given an interpretation
which would permit an indefinite continuation on
the nonconforming use. McQuillan on Municipal
Corporations, Third Edition, Volume 8, Section 8,
Section 25.189 and cases cited ...
The courts have gone far in holding that mere
non-use for a specified period of time may terminate the nonconforming use. See Standard Oil
Company v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F. 2d 410.

It seems well-established by the decisions that
ordinances such as the one at bar are valid and
constitutional. The only question that might arise
in each case is the reasonableness of the period of
time set forth in the ordinance. The court is satisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fied that the period of a year 1n the ordinance
herein is a reasonable one.''
See also Beszedes v. Board of Commissioners of
Arapahoe County, Colo. 178, P. 2d 950.
In the case at bar no building permit was requested
on the lot in question until1963. This is over seven years
from the date of dedication of the subdivision. Thus any
vested rights or established nonconforming use have now
long been abandoned.

POINT III.
APPELLANTS CANNOT COl\IPLAIN OVER
THEIR 0"\VN SELF-INFLICTED HARDSHIP.
Appellants Jack B. Wood and Shirl W. Hales purchased the property in question in January of 1963. This
was more than five years after the passage of the North
Salt Lake Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. Thus, at
the time of this purchase appellants had either actual or
constructive notice of the existing zoning regulations.
In a well-reasoned decision involving a similar fact
situation, the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of
Levy Y. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe County, 369
P. 2d 991, held that a self-inflicted hardship is a highly
significant fact which is a material element bearing on
the issue of the propriety of the refusal to grant a variance and weighs heaYily against a property owner
seeking a variance.
20
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the foregoing authorities, respondPnt respectfully requests that the decision of the
Xorth Salt Lake Board of Adjustment and the Davis
County District Court be affirmed.

THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS
& WEST
DAVID

E.

WEST

Attorneys for Defen.da,nt-Respondent
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